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Abstract 
 
With the demise of the Colombian cartels in the late 1980s, a new business paradigm has 
emerged in Colombia and other Latin American countries. Throughout the last several decades, 
numerous political, social, and economic factors have aided in the emergence and growth of this 
new illicit venture. Internally, illicit ventures are shaped by the state’s increased dependence on 
the illicit drug trade, a shift in societal acceptance of the ventures, the nature of Colombian 
culture, and a lack of opportunity in the legal economy. Externally, these ventures are shaped by 
increased foreign political pressure from the United States as well as economic globalization. 
These factors have aided in the emergence and development of these ventures, resulting in the 
ventures being increasingly more integrated economically, socially, and politically. I argue that 
these external and internal factors of Colombia’s environment have shaped new illicit business 
paradigms that, in practice, share many similarities to legal business paradigms. These ventures 















Much of the narrative that surrounds illicit ventures portrays a sensationalist view of extreme 
violence, corruption, and crime. Each day, mass media provides a commentary on the drug wars in 
Colombia, Mexico, and many other Latin American countries that perpetuates the same global 
response. This narrative and response exposes the inability of many to fully understand these illicit 
ventures. The ventures’ aim is simple but their organization is complex, focusing on supplying a 
very lucrative and high margin product to their customers. The demand for drugs remains 
dangerously high; the 230 million global drug users provide the ventures with a seemingly infinite 
number of customers. (Buggle, 2013, para. 9). To keep up with this demand, many illicit ventures 
are utilizing business paradigms similar to those of legal, multinational corporations. These 
standard business practices are merely adapted to fit their illicit product. As countries see a shift in 
the political, economic, and social landscapes, illicit ventures must further alter their business 
practices. 
  
Colombian drug trafficking emerged as a powerful strength with the development of the 
marijuana drug trade in the mid 1970s. By the 1980s, two large cocaine cartels grew out of the 
success of the marijuana trade. They then took a much more integrated role within Colombia and 
were making a profit similar to that of a number of multinational companies (Canales, 2013). The 
cartels’ size and structure required much of the same organization and practices of these same 
large corporations. After the cartels’ collapse in the early 1990s, smaller, more decentralized drug 
ventures emerged. Many of the new illicit ventures used the same paradigms of their predecessors, 
with some adaptation due to shifts in the internal and external environment. As they developed, 
these new ventures began to appear even more akin to legal businesses than the cartels had been. 
Because of this, I seek to explore what social, economic, and political factors have shaped the new 
business paradigm that is seen in these new illicit ventures. 
 
Through the examination of these political, social, and economic factors, I determined that 
there are six internal and external forces that aided in the emergence and development of the illicit 
ventures seen today. Focusing internally, the dependence of the government on the drug trade, the 
social shift in attitude towards the industry, the nature of Colombian culture, and the lack of ample 
opportunities in the legal economy all have helped shape the paradigms of illicit drug ventures. 
Externally, increased foreign political pressure on Colombia and economic globalization have 
aided in shaping these ventures as well. Based on this analysis, I argue that these external and 
internal factors of Colombia’s environment have shaped new illicit business paradigms that, in 
practice, share many similarities to legal business paradigms. Despite the present narrative that 
these ventures are merely simple and violent organizations, they are in fact very similar to legal 
businesses in countries that are characterized by these particular external and internal factors.   
 
The role of the illicit economy in the global political economy 
Defined as the relationship between states and international illegal markets, the illicit economy is 
an extremely prevalent and integrated part of the global political economy. Known by numerous 
names (shadow, hidden, black, underground, gray, clandestine, illegal, and parallel), this economy 
consists of undetected economic activities that are not recorded in national income reports 
(Fleming et al., 2000). There are numerous illicit activities including arms trafficking, human 
smuggling, organ trafficking, wildlife trafficking, piracy, drug trafficking, and counterfeiting 
(“Havocscope”, 2013). Specifically in Colombia, the list of illicit activities includes cocaine 
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production, manufacturing counterfeit U.S. dollars, producing (and using) assassins for hire, the 
export of prostitution in Latin America, and producing high quality counterfeit documents, pirated 
software and CDs (Thoumi, 2005).  
 
States ultimately have the capacity to define which activities are illicit, as the mere 
existence and enforcement of governmental controls are the drivers of innovation in these 
activities. Illicit ventures consistently have to improve their systems and business models to be 
able to evade state controls and enforcement in their industry (Andreas, 2004). In addition, some 
states have neglected to provide adequate and appropriate regulatory framework for legal 
businesses, which has provided an entry point for legal businesses to enter into partnerships with 
illicit ventures through areas such as money laundering and business fronts (Zeidler, 2011). 
Currently, many states that have previously struggled with defining boundaries and preventing the 
growth of illicit activities have reinstated their power through more expansive, comprehensive, 
and technological innovation; this has greatly aided in regulation efforts of the illicit economy 
(Andreas, 2004).   
 
States are unable to tax illicit activity causing state tax revenue to be much lower than it 
should be. Thus, the illicit economy limits the state’s ability to provide its citizens with the public 
goods their citizens need (Fleming et al., 2000). Bribery and corruption often run rampant 
throughout political institutions in countries with a large illicit economy, with states sometimes 
looking to illicit activity to provide state revenue. Low salaries paid to government workers and 
law enforcement agents often cause many to look elsewhere for payments, such as bribery from 
illicit activity (LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000). Specifically in Mexico, the state’s legal economic 
instability often leads to the state relying on illicit revenue to fund state activity (Andreas, 1998; 
Vellinga, 2004).  
 
The social, political, and legal characteristics of a country help to shape the composition 
and size of their illicit economies, which causes certain countries to be more susceptible to illicit 
activity. Developing countries, such as Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Brazil and 
Paraguay, greatly rely on the informal sector for employment and productivity. Between 1990 and 
1994, the illicit economy in these countries was 25-35 percent of these states’ productivity 
(Fleming et al., 2000, p. 405-406). However, with its clandestine nature, the illicit economy is 
extremely difficult to measure because of unreliable and undocumented data. It has been estimated 
by Havocscope, a leading provider of black market data and information, that the illicit economy 
today is worth over $1.79 trillion, with the drug trade being over $500 billion of that total number 
(“Havocscope”, 2013; Andreas, 2004)1. Even with a lower estimate of $100 billion in the drug 
trade industry, it would still be one of the leading industries in the international economy 
(Andreas, 2004).  
 
The nature of drug trafficking 
Countries can participate in drug trafficking in three ways: production, trans-shipment, and 
targeted consumption (Singer, 2008). Colombia acts as a country of production, which then 
                                            
1
 Statement from Havocscope, LLC: “The Havocscope World Black Market Value is the estimated value of the illegal 
black market. This figure is calculated by combining the total value of 50 global security threats along total value of 
illegal networks and markets in 91 countries. The total impact values from both the security threats and country 
markets are added together and divided by 2 in order to produce the estimated value of the black market.” 
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transships through numerous countries in Latin America and West Africa to target its main 
consumption areas of the United States and Europe. In 1993, over 23 percent of Colombia’s GNP 
came from the drug trade and 2.5 to 2.7 million people in Latin America relied on drug production 
for employment. Often the production and distribution of drugs provide a very similar 
socioeconomic structure within the country of that established by legal industries, particularly 
agribusiness (Salazar & Fierro, 1993, p. 87; Zabludoff, 1997).  
 
There are several key aspects that make a country particularly susceptible to the growth of 
drug trafficking. The legitimacy of the state, the existence of ample opportunities within an active 
national economy, societal acceptance of the drug trade, and pre-existing civil conflict are keys to 
the development of the drug industry within a country (Bybee, 2011). The Andean region, 
specifically Colombia, has seen huge growth in drug trafficking over several decades. Aiding in 
this growth is the government’s inability to remain accountable to citizens, fight corruption, and 
exert state power over large geographic areas (Vellinga, 2004). Colombia is split by three 
mountain ranges, with the easternmost range containing half of the total land in Colombia. Four-
fifths of Colombians live in the western region (McLean, 2002). The government does not have 
the resources to effectively combat these geographic and social challenges, and ultimately has lost 
the state’s legitimacy and accountability. Without state power in these regions, drug traffickers are 
able to take over and provide Colombians with economic growth, employment, and public goods 
(McLean, 2002; Thoumi, 2005; Vellinga, 2004).  
 
When drug trafficking initially emerged in the 1980s, the economic benefits it generated 
caused many Colombians to view its growth as positive (Hartlyn, 1993). The legal economy was 
not able to provide the employment opportunities that the illicit economy was able to provide 
Colombians (Fleming et al., 2000). Today over 300,000 Colombians work within the drug 
industry and roughly the same number of Mexicans are growing drug crops in Mexico (Andreas, 
1998, p. 160; Podur, 2003, para. 5). Individuals involved in any aspect of the supply chain now 
rely on drug trafficking for their economic livelihood and have come to accept the violence of the 
industry as a social norm (Whiteford, 2002).  
 
The theory of constructivism helps to explain the role that history and norms have played 
in establishing and promoting the drug trade. It examines the idea that society and political actors 
are merely adhering to the social rules and norms that society has established (Balaam & Dillman, 
2011). The lack of state power, geographic challenges, and a history of civil violence in Colombia 
caused the establishment of the drug trade as a norm in society. Without any sense of social 
cohesion or national identity, factions within society appeared and the government began 
promoting a zero-sum partisanship, leaving society to deal with and accept the violence that 
followed. As drug cartels began integrating themselves into society and political institutions, they 
were able to provide the resources and economic stability that the government could not (Brysk, 
2009). The head of the Medellin cartel, Pablo Escobar, held a political office, provided housing for 
the extreme poor, and built soccer pitches throughout his community (Zimbalist et al., 2010). The 
violence continued, but society began to look at these drug lords as legitimate leaders who 
provided a logical narrative that allowed society to accept drug trafficking as a norm and a part of 
their society (Brysk, 2009).  
 
 4 
Historically, violence and civil conflict in Colombia existed before the emergence of the 
drug trade, during a period of civil conflict known as La Violencia from 1947 to 1958 (Millet, 
2002). This period of time is seen to have destroyed social capital within Colombia and aided in 
the increased regionalism of the country with a large migration from rural to urban (Brysk, 2009; 
Thoumi & Windybank, 2007). Initially, the primary cause for violence was the uneven distribution 
of resources, particularly land, that the government had failed to address. Drug traffickers bought 
large sections of land and guerrilla groups began to set up their own form of land reform. These 
groups then built roads and schools, and contributed to political campaigns. Under a government 
that did little to help society, criminal groups were the ones to provide the needed resources to the 
communities they operated in. This community support from the drug traffickers has caused many 
Colombians to endure and accept this way of life (Whiteford, 2002). This social acceptance of the 
drug trade, the state’s ineffective combative methods and historical civil violence has shaped a 
new social reality that effectively allows drug production and trade to be a norm within society 
(Pankratz & Matiasek, 2011). 
 
Components of business paradigms 
Defined as a clear example, model, or pattern in business, business paradigms often provide the 
precedence that companies rely on to implement business practices that will help them grow. More 
often than not, these paradigms can shift to respond to a change in the external or internal 
environment that the business operates in. Businesses confront these challenges on a daily basis; 
some being so radically different than the norm that a new model is needed to establish new 
strategies and management practices. As mentioned earlier, illicit ventures use business paradigms 
and practices that legal businesses rely on to operate in the legal economy. The illicit nature of 
their product often forces many to adapt these paradigms for an illicit context. 
 
Business paradigms in an illicit context 
The capitalist mode of production has ultimately turned drugs into a new, extremely profitable 
commodity that attracts many entrepreneurs (Salazar & Fierro, 1993). Many of these entrepreneurs 
pursue a profit from this illicit commodity using similar, yet slightly different business practices 
than a legal business would use. Due to the illicit nature of the product, many use a mix of legal 
and illegal business practices that allows them to continue the growth of their venture. Since they 
are operating outside boundaries of formal institutions, they use illegal methods to overcome and 
deal with issues outside of legal boundaries (Singer, 2008; Webb et al., 2009). Areas of business 
like conflict management cannot be dealt with formally due to the illegality of the business, fair 
prices not being government set, and mediation of drug related problems not being taken 
seriously. Due to little government arbitration or formal boundaries, illegal and informal measures 
are used to settle conflicts (Jacques & Wright, 2011). 
 
Similar to legal entrepreneurs, illicit entrepreneurs are motivated by profit and have the 
same desires as their legal counterparts. They have a heightened desire for wealth, are comfortable 
risk-takers, and are extremely competent in their chosen field (Smith, 2009). Before becoming an 
entrepreneur or head of an illicit venture, many are trained by high-level people within their fields, 
reflecting the structure of an internship or mentorship (Vannostrand, 1999). They are able to learn 
each aspect of the trade that enables them to move up in the business once their mentor trusts 
them.  Many of these entrepreneurs typically obtain ownership over their illicit venture by 
exploiting opportunities in the market (as was seen in the establishment of Colombian cartels), 
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exploiting connections with people already in the drug trade, or obtaining ownership through 
succession and promotion (Brice, 2003; Vannostrand, 1999). 
 
An illicit entrepreneur’s focus on growth ventures often means that he follows the standard 
and legal entrepreneurial process to build a business (Zabludoff, 1997). This process is broken 
down into the stages of 1) entrepreneurial alertness, 2) opportunity recognition, 3) opportunity 
exploitation, and 4) decisions concerning growth. Just as an entrepreneur in a legal business would 
be alert to opportunities, illicit entrepreneurs are able to recognize opportunities and begin their 
business based off growth decisions. Opportunity recognition can occur spontaneously with an 
idea brought on as a flash of insight. The entrepreneur will then exploit opportunities by 
leveraging new and existing resources to establish more effective processes. For drug 
entrepreneurs, this could be exploiting, or even taking over, existing networks or distribution 
channels. Lastly, entrepreneurs will make decisions that will allow their venture to grow. This 
could include sustaining their business in existing markets while also leveraging opportunities in 
new markets  (Webb et al., 2009).  More than likely every legal sector has an illicit counterpart 
that entrepreneurs can thus recognize and then exploit (Andreas, 2004).  
 
The business model of an illicit venture 
A standard business model consists of four main components: customer value proposition (CVP), 
profit formula, key resources, and key activities. This same business model, which is commonly 
used in licit ventures, can effectively be applied to illicit ventures. The customer value proposition 
consists of the value transfer that occurs from dealer to customers. As drugs are highly addictive in 
nature, much of the value is perceived as the high that the customer receives from the provided 
drugs (Kurrle, 2013). The United States accounts for more than half of the global demand for 
drugs, resulting in a relatively consistent demand that has shown great profits (Canales, 2013). 
However, illicit ventures are always looking for unfilled demand that they can cater. There is no 
customer loyalty to a certain drug venture, as customers will seek the most easily accessible or 
cheapest drug they can find. Because of this, many illicit ventures unleash extreme violence to kill 
off competition for control of the border, markets, raw materials, and distribution of the product 
(Kurrle, 2013; Salazar & Fierro, 1993). Much of the territorial battles that occur in Mexico stem 
from the major cartels competing for dominance in the industry as well as the drug routes into the 
United States (Khan, 2013). 
 
The profit formula is much more difficult to accurately depict due to the lack of public 
financial statements and cash transactions. Profit margins are enormous: one transport of a 
delivery across the border provides a steep increase in their profit margin. The expense of losing a 
shipment is merely the cost of doing business. Entrepreneurs follow the principle ‘with high risk 
comes high reward’ and it often pays off if they are willing to take the risk. As it stands today, 
Mexican and Colombian cartels have raked in a profit of $4.6 billion just from exporting to the 
United States (Badkar, 2011, slide 4). Expenses also consist of the cost of paying their employees, 
their subcontractors and bribes. Venture capital is also seen in illicit enterprises as they look to 
invest in and provide capital for an external firm to do research and development. This is 
extremely necessary for the venture to stay ahead of its competition and increased policing efforts 
(Kurrle, 2013).  
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An illicit venture’s key resources are vital for their survival and key to their business 
model. People are a huge resource, and somewhat of a liability, to these ventures. They generally 
have been trained through first hand experience, which allows them to fully understand the 
networks that surround the business. The venture can combat any risk of disloyalty by stressing a 
culture of trust, secrecy, and loyalty while also promoting a reputation of violence that is known 
within their network and community. In the enterprise, this culture is held in high regard and is 
both extremely important to the fellow employees as well as the leaders of the venture. Trust must 
be established between the venture and the workers, as this will reduce the likelihood that, if 
caught by law enforcement, they will give up information (Kurrle, 2013). Similar to legal 
businesses, trust is gained through business processes such as following through on agreements. In 
order to minimize risk, avoid detection, and neutralize competition, secrecy is used by the venture 
to protect their business and its people. Without traditional marketing methods, keeping 
information on contacts, partners, markets, and clients a secret is vital to gain an edge over 
competition. An illicit venture’s reputation is often built off of violence or the discourse that 
surrounds them (Kurrle, 2013; Zaitch, 2005). Violence is often used not only as a reputation 
builder but also as a resource to enforce deals, resolve conflicts, and threaten competitors and law 
enforcement (Singer, 2008; Zaitch, 2005).  
 
Their processes heavily depend on the bribery and extortion on key players within their 
industry. These can be law enforcement officials who, in Mexico, fight over major smuggling 
routes for the bigger bribes or prominent government officials that are threatened, assassinated, or 
bribed to reverse or lobby for legislation (Andreas, 1998; Kurrle, 2013). They also rely heavily on 
intelligence for the surveillance of all their operations, which require precision and careful 
planning (Kurrle, 2013). Efficiency and effectiveness greatly depend on their ability to acquire 
intelligence that will aid in anticipating advanced and updated policing efforts (Williams, 1998).     
 
The structure of an illicit venture 
The constantly changing environment requires drug ventures to be highly flexible and promote 
redundancy in their supply base and product to operate. If for any reason their networks are 
compromised, they are flexible enough that they can alter their shape and have enough redundancy 
built in so that they can still operate and supply their product to their consumers. The threat of 
enforcement, disloyal employees that give away trade secrets, and competition forces ventures to 
rely heavily on networks within their core and periphery networks (Williams, 1998).  
 
The core is composed of a dense network of connected individuals that lead the entire 
organization. Entry into the core largely depends on the level of trust that one has within the 
organization. The core remains autonomous and directive of the periphery (Zabludoff, 1997). 
Generally, with a top leader that handles major decisions, the core is connected and bonded by 
high levels of trust, which is critical for the sustainability of the operation (Williams, 1998; 
Zabludoff, 1997). Similar to CEOs of large, legal businesses, the leadership of an illicit venture 
must consist of quick decision-makers that are highly flexible in making changes. Leaders of illicit 
ventures are not afraid to use violence to establish dominance and power. They oversee all day-to-




The periphery is made up of essential employees that have much looser relationships. 
Depending on the size of the organization, this can consist of 100-200 people with over 100 
subcontractors that specialize in specific functions throughout the organization (Lopez et al., 
2001). For many Mexican cartels, they are known to employ at least half a million people (Khan, 
2013). Similar to a large corporation, the venture will often employ legal lawyers, economists, and 
other financial experts that can provide wealth management within their periphery (Lopez et al., 
2001).  New people are constantly brought into the industry to increase the reach of the venture 
and grow their activities while reducing the risk of day-to-day operations (Williams, 1998; 
Zabludoff, 1997). Each part of the periphery only knows the information that is needed for their 
operations, which often causes many employees to feel less connected or bonded to the 
organization (Kurrle, 2013). As these ventures amass a greater amount of profit and grow, the 
scope of the periphery increases (Lopez et al., 2001).   
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and investment  
Many of the drug cartels in the 1980s and drug entrepreneurs today invest some of their profits 
locally, whether it is for their own economic interests or for community improvement. Regardless 
of the intent of their investments, their money is injected into the economy, which helps to 
improve the economy while often improving the lives of thousands. A large share of their 
investments is used to acquire property and businesses in Colombia (Zabludoff, 1997). As 
discussed earlier, Pablo Escobar invested in the community through housing projects for the poor, 
improving soccer field conditions, and other endeavors that improved the lives of Colombia’s 
most poor (Vellinga, 2004; Zimbalist et al., 2010). Some Mexican cartels organize community 
events such as picnics and barbecues (Khan, 2013). The relationship that is built between an 
illegal business and the community is very important due in large part on the venture’s 
dependence on society for resources as well as its legitimacy (Brice, 2003). Through this corporate 
social responsibility, the Medellin cartel had the backing of some of the nation’s poorest 
neighborhoods and was ultimately able to gain legitimacy from the community (Zimbalist et al., 
2010). Conversely, the Cali cartel extended their economic prowess through the construction and 
operation of 432 drugstores. In addition, they owned hotels, supermarkets, banks and credit 
institutions, radio stations, soccer clubs, airlines, and labs that went towards the betterment of 
society and economic strength as they invested in legal businesses (Vellinga, 2004).  
 
Illicit entrepreneurs today in Colombia have a much lower profile within society, but they 
still invest in the legal economy by extending their business into society through contracting 
services of legal businesses. These services can include transportation, security, banking, 
communication, investment and legal assistance, and, perhaps the most controversial, money 
laundering (Andreas, 1998; Vellinga, 2004). For products sold in the United States, the drug 
traffickers must convert the huge sum of U.S. dollars to pesos without detection. Often, many 
legal banks are involved in this transaction (especially U.S. banks), whether the bank is aware of it 
or not. Colombian traffickers have been known to utilize the legal services of banks in Colombia, 
the United States, and Mexico to launder their money. HSBC in Mexico recently was exposed 
after a drug lord claimed the bank to be “the place to launder money” (“HSBC”, 2012). As they 
strive to blend in more with mainstream society, these ventures take part in legal and illegal 
transactions and businesses, which makes it difficult to isolate illicit transactions and distinguish 
business fronts from legitimate businesses (Zabludoff, 1997).  
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The shift in the illicit business paradigm  
The Colombian drug trade rapidly emerged in 1975 with the marijuana trade and the coffee boom. 
Mexico was undergoing major interdiction efforts that opened the door for Colombia to take over 
70 percent of the market share of the marijuana going into the United States (Garavito, 2013). This 
along with the Colombian coffee boom led to an influx in foreign exchange that poured into the 
economy causing inflation to rise. To address this crisis, the president at the time, Lopez 
Michelsen, declared a state of economic emergency in order to pass measures that would stabilize 
the economy. This included significantly cutting public investment and social welfare programs. 
These measures, in addition to several other austere ones, did little to help; they merely widened 
the income gap and established a great dissent towards the government (Butler, 1999). While the 
coffee boom did not continue, the drug trade flourished. It had endured the economic crisis and 
brought about continued economic growth. The initial growth in the mid to late 1970s established 
support for the drug trade among several factions of society, especially growers in rural areas 
(Hartlyn, 1993). The wealthier the drug cartels became, the more money they would invest in the 
economy and the community. One example of this improvement occurred with the construction of 
buildings, both residential and commercial, by the cartels. This construction would provide jobs to 
community members as well as build residences and office space for locals. The height of wealth 
for the cartels in the early to mid 1980s was a time that the illicit economy actually benefited more 
Colombians than the legal economy (Garavito, 2013). 
 
The era of the cartels and the drug lords began in the early 1980s. The country was run by 
two main cartels, both headed by Colombian drug lords that had earned a large majority of their 
money from the marijuana trade. The Medellin cartel, run by Pablo Escobar, and the Cali cartel 
had since diversified their product and began to control more than 70 percent of the Colombian 
cocaine exports by the mid 1980s (López et al., 2001p. 15). The Medellin cartel unleashed 
extreme violence to gain control of the industry, the state and its people, often using the threat 
plata o plomo (silver or lead) to establish corruption among various ranks in the state (McLean, 
2002; Vellinga, 2004). This corruption ran rampant as many accepted bribes out of fear of 
assassination by Escobar. The judicial system was torn apart as many judges were killed after the 
sentencing of various drug traffickers within the cartels. It was this corruption and fear within the 
government that ultimately caused the deterioration of many Colombian institutions and state 
sovereignty, allowing further growth of the drug trade (McLean, 2002).   
 
By the early 1990s, more threats came from the United States government to end the 
cartels’ control of Colombia. The Colombian government began to strike back against the cartels, 
but not yet with the purpose of destroying them. The differing goals of the United States and 
Colombian governments created tension between the two countries (Friman & Andreas, 1999). 
With the threat of being extradited, Escobar took advantage of this tension and lobbied to pass 
legislation banning extradition in 1991. He killed anyone that blocked him and eventually had the 
President change the Constitution so that no one could be extradited to the United States 
(Zimbalist et al., 2010). However, as the pressure from the United States continued and the 
Colombian government continued to fail to respond to public problems, violent riots broke out 
throughout the capital Bogota. In the end, police and military forces were able to shoot and kill 
Escobar, ultimately ending the Medellin cartel’s reign on December 2, 1993. The Cali cartel took 
over the cocaine market, but by 1995 was overtaken by the Colombian government (Friman & 
Andreas, 1999).  
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The demise of the cartels did little to slow the production and supply of drugs; it merely 
changed the structure of the business paradigm. The departure of the big drug lords brought with it 
much less order in the drug world and more opportunity for newer, smaller enterprises to establish 
themselves in the market (LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000). Instead of two main cartels in Colombia, 
there are now between 250 and 300 trafficking enterprises that are much smaller, enclosed and 
secretive than the cartels before them (López et al., 2001, p. 24).  
 
The paradigms these ventures utilize are an adaptation of those used by the cartels before 
them. The continued crackdown on drug traffickers caused these new ventures to decentralize and 
reduce their size allowing much more flexibility for the changing environment (Vellinga, 2004). 
The large, visible size of the cartels was a significant part of their undoing, which the new 
ventures recognized and thus corrected. Operating as smaller, more disconnected cells has allowed 
these new ventures to collaborate much more effectively with a variety of partners that specialize 
in certain areas. One criminal organization may be specialized in production while another may be 
more efficient in distribution; the new ventures partner with the most specialized (Germain, 2010). 
In addition, they directly injected themselves into the international market to establish new 
distribution channels as well as enter new markets (Lopez et al., 2001). The chart below compares 
the paradigms of the old and new illicit ventures: 
 
Paradigm Old Illicit Venture New Illicit Venture 
Brand Reputation Yes Yes 
Visibility to the public Yes No 
International channels No, not past Central and North America Yes 
Efficient distribution channels Yes Yes 
Supplier relations Yes Yes 
Political lobbying/participation Yes No 
Human resources Yes Yes 
Quality control Yes Yes 
Research and Development Yes Yes 
Corporate Social Responsibility Yes Yes 
Centralized Structure Yes No 
Partnerships No Yes 
Customer relationship management Yes Yes 
Bribery  Yes Yes, less visible though 
 
Specifically, as the United States pushed through with its war on drugs, many of the old 
trafficking routes through the Caribbean and Latin America became heavily guarded. Because of 
this intensification of border control and political pressure on eradicating drugs, the new drug 
ventures needed to diversify their transit routes and form a new strategy to supply the United 
States. These illicit ventures’ new size and flexibility made it possible to expand internationally 
into countries like Guinea Bissau and establish themselves there for easier entrance into another 
large market, Europe (Rodas, 2013). Additionally, the need to continue supplying the United 
States forced many of these enterprises to partner with Mexican cartels, since NAFTA allowed 
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easier trade across borders. The importance and success of this partnership with Mexican cartels 
cannot be overstated. Approximately 93 percent of cocaine leaving South America for the United 
States now travels through Mexico (Perkins and Placido, 2010, para. 10). The image below depicts 



















Source: Canales, Rodrigo. 2013. The 
deadly genius of drug cartels. Ted Talk, October 2013. 
http://www.ted.com/talks/rodrigo_canales_the_deadly_genius_of_drug_cartels.html 
 
In response to this increase in the amount of cocaine traveling across borders, many 
initiatives have been put in place to monitor the movement. This has forced many of these 
ventures to export small amounts and reduce the risk of their load being seized across the border. 
The ventures have altered their transportation system to be multi-stage rather than one step 
transportation like the cartels before them. The sheer amount of goods, both licit and illicit, 
flowing between the borders made it extremely difficult for border officials to find the small, but 
frequent shipments exported by these new ventures (Dermota, 1999; Perkins and Placido, 2010; 
Zabludoff, 1997).  
 
The smaller size of these ventures allowed the business to extend itself into Colombian 
society. The size of the old ventures provided a large enough internal network that could provide 
them with the resources they required. Transportation, production, and distribution were usually 
done by their periphery network allowing them to rely less on outside resources. As these ventures 
decreased in size, much of the services they needed were no longer available within the 
organization, so they looked to the community to provide those services. When the drug cartels 
disbanded, many small businesses working with the cartels lost their power both economically and 
politically. This faction of small businesses within society thus accepted this new paradigm and 
many of these same legal businesses became subcontractors for these ventures, thereby allowing 
the drug ventures to become decentralized and further expand among society. As mentioned 
earlier, transportation, legal services, investment consulting, and money laundering were services 
needed by these new ventures. Society began to accept the expansion of this industry into society 
and was able and willing to provide these services (Vellinga, 2004).  
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 Today, the drug ventures continue their expansion throughout Colombia, with 
paramilitaries becoming much more involved in the production of the coca plant. The guerrilla’s 
military chain of command structure has greatly aided in their success in the industry, with clear 
promotion paths and clear authority figures (Canales, 2013). Their protection of coca fields will 
cause Colombia to miss their 2013 target of eradicating 135,000 hectares of coca by a considerable 
margin. The guerrillas have been known to shoot down aerial spray planes, set booby traps for 
manual eradicators, and pressure communities into obstructing access to the fields (Parkinson, 
2013). This guerrilla protection allows these new ventures to diversify their portfolio and broaden 
their reach into Colombian life; they now participate in extortion, illegal gold mining, micro 
trafficking, gambling, and marijuana dealing in Colombian cities (McDermott, 2013).  
 
The illicit paradigm as found in Mexico 
To fully develop a clear picture of the operations of drug ventures, it is imperative to look at the 
country of Mexico and, in particular, the Sinaloa cartel. The Mexican experience is quite similar to 
that of Colombia, only with a more recent entrance into the drug trade. Once NAFTA was 
established in 1994, the floodgates opened for drug trafficking in Mexico. Many entrepreneurs in 
Mexico recognized the opportunity in working with Colombian producers of cocaine and 
exploited it. These ventures had previously been exporting marijuana and smaller amounts of 
cocaine, but by the mid 1990s they had begun to export 75-85 percent of the cocaine into the 
United States (Gootenberg, 2011, p. 9). The United States Drug Enforcement Administration 
estimates that Mexico earned more than $30 billion in revenue in 1994, the same year that 
NAFTA was signed (Andreas, 1998, p. 160). Mexico’s origin in the drug trade stems from similar 
sources as Colombia. The drug trade flourished in Mexico due to the lack of economic 
opportunity, widespread inequality among rural regions, and poor state management.   
 
Political, social, and economic dimensions  
There have been high levels of inequality amongst rural populations with little opportunity for 
legal employment and high migration out of these towns. An ethnographic study that was done by 
James McDonald (2005) in a small, rural Mexican town of 10,000 people shows the extent to 
which the drug trade has affected many rural people. Like many rural communities in Colombia, 
the town had historically relied on agricultural for their livelihoods. However, the onset of 
globalization made it difficult for these communities to keep up, which led to widespread 
unemployment, displacement, and migration. The result was devastating: dramatic inequality 
(McDonald, 2005).  
 
This industry generated jobs for these communities both indirectly and directly; it provided 
an “underground exit option” for those that had limited employment options in the legal economy. 
Currently, there is an estimated 300,000 people in Mexico purely growing drug crops, which does 
not include the other services these drug ventures employ (Andreas, 1998).  Politically, the drug 
trade has been able to exploit the weaknesses of the state, which has allowed the industry to 
flourish. It is estimated that Mexican cocaine traffickers spend $500 million a year on bribes. The 
ventures also take advantage of the poor state management that is prevalent throughout much of 





The business paradigms of the Sinaloa Cartel 
Operating as one of the largest and most powerful illicit organizations in the western hemisphere, 
the Sinaloa cartel enjoys a $3 billion yearly revenue, which is comparable to the earnings of 
Facebook. Their reach is global, with operations in over twelve countries but remains highly 
flexible (Keefe, 2012). Their global operation structure and organization resembles many of the 
paradigms that large multinational corporations use. The cartel controls a large amount of territory 
along the U.S.-Mexican border, which they defend violently (“Insight Crime”, 2012). The large 
amount of territory requires strong leadership and networks to maintain and protect their control.  
 
The Treasury Department has described the leader of the Sinaloa cartel, Joaquin “El 
Chapo” Guzman, as the world’s most powerful drug trafficker. In order to protect the powerful El 
Chapo, the organizational structure of the cartel and the networks are designed accordingly. There 
is no count on the number of people working for the cartel, including those subcontracted by the 
cartel. Police and border officials have been known to work closely with the cartel, providing it 
with eyes and ears in many different social and political arenas. It was exposed in early 2010 by a 
former police officer working for Sinaloa that the cartel had the entire Mexican police force on its 
payroll. The cartel also pays civilian lookouts $100 a month just to monitor border inspections and 
police convoys (Keefe, 2012). Sinaloa recently partnered with the Gulf cartel, La Familia 
Michoacana, and Tijuana cartel, which has provided the cartel with an even larger network 
throughout Mexico (“Insight Crime”, 2012).  
 
Similar to a legal business, Sinaloa is very conscious of their brand reputation and its 
impact on the cartel’s operations. The cartel has built up a brand of professionalism, innovation, 
and business savvy that Sinaloa strives to protect (Canales, 2013). The cartel can be exceedingly 
brutal and violent, but they are also very conscious about the consequences of excessive violence. 
Violence is used strategically for intimidation, but will never be overused. This pragmatic 
approach to the use of violence has allowed Sinaloa to cultivate necessary relationships with 
communities and protect the cartel’s brand (Keefe, 2012).  
 
Additionally, the cartel has been regarded as one of the most innovative in the industry due 
in large part to El Chapo’s many contributions.  Perhaps one of the most prominent innovations 
that El Chapo developed was a tunnel between the United States and Mexico. This underground 
passageway provided the cartel with heightened access to their largest market. After the tunnel 
was discovered, El Chapo developed a new approach of shipping canned goods full of cocaine 
from Guadalajara to Mexican owned grocery stores in California. This strategic and frequent 
innovation has allowed the cartel to stay ahead of competition, often being a first mover in new 
markets. The cartel has begun selling cocaine to Australia while also exploring opportunities in 
Southeast Asia, Japan, and China (Keefe, 2012).  
 
The role of large cartels like Sinaloa in the Mexican experience provides an interesting 
comparison to the discussion on Colombian illicit ventures. However different these illicit 
ventures are in terms of size and global prowess, Mexican cartels utilize business paradigms that 
are not only similar to those of large legal corporations, but are also characterized by the internal 
and external factors of Mexico. By looking further at the impact of the Colombian political, social, 
and economic dimensions on illicit ventures, we can identify the characteristics of Colombia that 
impact and shape the business paradigms of these ventures. 
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The role of the state in shaping illicit ventures 
Throughout the course of Colombia’s drug trafficking history, the role of the state in the growth 
and progression of these illicit ventures is quite prevalent. As the drug industry has grown through 
the integration of the industry into the political landscape, the state has become more and more 
dependent on the profits generated from such a lucrative industry. As the United States and other 
countries initiated a war on drugs, external political pressure has forced the Colombian state to 
reduce the visibility of its activities in aiding illicit ventures, which shapes the business paradigms 
of the smaller drug ventures seen in Colombia today.  
  
Since the beginning of the cocaine industry in Colombia in the 1980s, the state has 
tolerated the industry with little intervention or control, which has allowed drug traffickers to 
exploit weak institutions (Hartlyn, 1993). Thoumi (2005) and Hartlyn (1993) assert that the initial 
belief about the industry was that it had very few perceived negative effects; the huge economic 
boom of the drug trade initially brought with it relief from Colombia’s chronic foreign exchange 
scarcity. As discussed previously, money and foreign exchange from the drug trade was injected 
into a stagnant economy, causing many citizens and governmental officials to view the drug trade 
as a positive and welcome change.  
 
As illicit ventures integrated themselves into the system, Colombia has become 
increasingly dependent on these ventures due to the number of benefits the country receives 
(Hartlyn, 1993). The way the state is politically structured and the lack of campaign finance 
controls greatly aided the infiltration of illicit money entering the political process (Hartlyn, 1993; 
Thoumi, 2005).  Many governmental officials benefit from the bribery and the corruption 
associated with the state’s dealings with the drug traffickers. Illicit ventures produce larger bribes 
for governmental officials and law enforcement officers in response to increased outside pressure 
put on countries to halt these ventures (Andreas, 1998).  In Mexico, it was estimated that in 1996, 
70-80 percent of the judicial police force were corrupt. Of the 270 corrupt employees fired by the 
attorney general that same year, many were merely rehired in other parts of Mexico or reinstated 
after challenging their firing in court (Andreas, 1998, p.164).   
  
Changes in the political landscape in the 1990s greatly aided in shaping the smaller drug 
ventures seen today. As discussed earlier, the war on drugs in the United States brought with it a 
crackdown on drug shipments arriving in Florida by way of the Caribbean, which forced many 
drug ventures to change their routes (Dermota, 1999). With this constant attack and changing 
international policies, these enterprises needed to adapt to survive and sought new ways to 
continue to deliver their product to the United States markets (Kurrle, 2013). After the 
implementation of NAFTA, the decision to begin shipping through Mexico to the United States 
was an easy one. The illicit ventures need to be more nimble and willing to transport smaller 
shipments to get past heightened security on the Mexican border. As this security increased, the 
need to bribe officials and government officials increased, which also increased the state’s 
dependency on these ventures’ success (Dermota, 1999). In Mexico alone, it is estimated that as 
much as $30 billion a year is being laundered for the drug trade, with 10 percent of that being used 
for law enforcement, military, and political payoffs (Eskridge, 2001).  
 
 14 
As the suppression of the drug trade continued, outside political pressure forced the 
Colombian government to be less visible in its activity with drug traffickers. The state’s 
cooperation with paramilitaries made this invisibility possible. The involvement of the 
paramilitary in drug trafficking is extensive, with much of the paramilitaries’ income generated 
from various activities within the drug trade (Hristov, 2009). This includes using extreme violence 
to protect inputs, production sites, and labs (Salazar & Fierro, 1993). In 2002, there was a secret 
negotiation between paramilitaries and the Colombian state, which ended in the incorporation of 
the paramilitary into the state and economy. This relationship has enabled the state to “conceal its 
role and evade responsibility for crimes by entrusting much of the dirty work to armed civilian 
groups which operate under the clandestine coordination of the army and the police” (Hristov, 
2009, p. 14).  The governmental tie to paramilitaries only increased; by mid-2008, over 40 percent 
of Congress members were found to have close ties to paramilitaries (Hristov, 2009, p. 15). 
Paramilitaries provided the apparatus in which to hide the state’s role within drug trafficking. 
Under the Uribe administration from 2002 to 2010, coca cultivation actually increased throughout 
much of his term. The graph below depicts the lack of state control over, or the possible state ties 
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As the states role became less visible through their relationship with paramilitaries, the 
ventures were still able to exploit the government and continue to cultivate coca. If these new 
ventures were any larger or more visible, they would not be able to benefit from their relationship 
with the government and the paramilitaries, which would harm their ability to produce and 
distribute cocaine (Vellinga, 2004). 
 
The effects of illicit ventures on the state 
Not only has corruption and bribery left citizens with little faith in the ethics of their government, 
but it also has led to the government’s loss of legitimacy and an inability to protect their citizens’ 
human, labor, or legal rights that Colombian’s are constitutionally guaranteed. The country has 
been able to maintain its democracy even with the drug trade’s presence, with free elections, a 
resilient Constitution, and a well-developed judicial system. However, the state remains weak, 
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offering little protection of its citizens’ rights (Brysk, 2009). Similarly, Guinea Bissau’s drug 
trafficker-tainted government remains irrelevant to many citizens as it completely lacks basic 
functions and fails to produce any benefits for its citizens (Kohnert, 2010). 
 
This was seen in the country of Guinea Bissau, as government officials and traffickers 
entered into what was seen as a mutually beneficial relationship, allowing traffickers to operate 
freely in the country (Bybee, 2011). Guinea Bissau was the most enticing of countries for the new 
ventures due to the poor, uneducated population and the country’s lack of natural resources. The 
unprotected and unpoliced coastline and ninety islands, allowed easy exploitation by the drug 
ventures. Corruption further aided in the development of the relationship between the military elite 
and the drug ventures allowing access to key ports, airstrips, and human capital needed to 
transport the product (Rodas, 2013; Zeidler, 2011). By expanding into these new countries for 
transshipment, the ventures are able to diversify their supplier points, invest in other economies, 
and utilize a new, desperate population and government (Thoumi & Windybank, 2007).  
 
By the early 1990s, attempts to destroy the drug trade in Colombia had led to the beginning 
of eradication campaigns as suggested by the United States. In an effort to save their livelihood, 
many growers lobbied their government for legalization rather than eradication. The government 
did not listen and with further outside political pressure began to eradicate crops. This displaced 
many growers as they watched their livelihood burn before their eyes and were unable to replant 
anything on their now barren land. Left with no other alternatives, many guerrilla groups found 
new recruits among the displaced farmers adding to the strength and size of these violent groups 
(Friman & Andreas, 1999; LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000). The eradication campaign only fueled a 
larger distrust in the government that these guerrilla groups and drug traffickers were able to take 
advantage of.  
 
In the face of such violence, turmoil and displacement, Colombians have the right to 
expect security and protection from their government (McLean, 2002). However, the 
government’s attempt to disintegrate the cartels in the late 1980s left over a thousand people dead, 
including 500 police, 40 judges, and 500 civilians (LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000; Singer, 2008). The 
violence only continued as the government and smaller enterprises continued to use paramilitaries 
and guerrilla groups to aid in the drug trade. In 2002 alone, the number of human rights violations 
and displacement of Colombian people was staggering: 373,020 Colombians were displaced, 
2,986 kidnapped, 500 ‘disappeared’, and 4,000 killed as a result of political conflict (Holmes et 
al., 2006, p. 13). Paramilitaries account for over 80 percent of these human rights violations even 
after the state declared them illegal in 1989 (Holmes et al., p. 13). The participation of the 
guerrillas in the drug trade has proved to be a huge source of funding for the guerrillas, which has 
made it extremely difficult for the government to come to a peace agreement with them. The 
inability of the government to effectively manage the state and protect its citizens has caused the 
loss of the legitimacy of the government. However, in the past few months, the government has 
begun to establish a peace agreement with the guerrillas and regain some control over the state 
(Neuman, 2013).  
 
In the last month, the government has been able to make movement towards accomplishing 
a peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group by 
establishing a framework for FARC to participate in the political process. The guerrilla group has 
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not yet ceased warfare or put down its weapons, but if a full peace deal is completed, the guerrillas 
could possibly establish a political party and run candidates in elections. This would be a huge 
step in helping to stop the extreme violence that is still prevalent throughout Colombia (Neuman, 
2013). In an effort to influence these peace talks to advocate for societal and economic rights, 150 
illicit crop growers in Colombia met last week in Bogota to advocate for their human rights. It is 
their hope that the solutions reached will also be solutions for those whose livelihood depends on 
the illicit crops. They want the solutions to be all encompassing rather than just to solve the 
violence between the government and the paramilitaries (Volckhausen, 2013).  
 
The role of society in shaping illicit ventures 
As the shift occurred in the business paradigm in illicit ventures in 1991, there was a coinciding 
shift in society’s attitudes towards the drug industry. This shift in attitude toward the drug 
industry, along with the Colombian culture, ultimately shaped both the cartel’s business paradigm 
as well as the new illicit business paradigm today.  
  
Historically, Colombia has had difficulty establishing a common national identity that each 
region can share and take pride in. As mentioned above, the extreme regions within Colombia’s 
geography made it difficult for a social structure to be established that allowed upward social 
mobility throughout the country (Vellinga, 2004). With the introduction of the coca trade in the 
Andean region, much of their culture and traditional way of life is now intertwined with the coca 
plant and the trading of it (Morales, 1986). As the constructivist theory suggests, the history of La 
Violencia has made it difficult for Colombians to break the norm of internal violence formed 
during that time (Millet, 2002; Thoumi, 2005).  
 
La Violencia destroyed social capital in Colombia, leaving the country with an 
individualistic society (Brysk, 2009). Instead of a collective identity that some nations share, 
Colombian culture promotes individuals seizing opportunities that will most benefit them as an 
individual. As the drug cartels began to seize power in Colombia, individuals acted upon their own 
self interest in joining an industry that did more harm to the collective (Thoumi, 2005). 
Colombians began to legitimize the drug industry and the employment they had within it. 
Constructivists would say that Colombians began to accept the violence and the industry as social 
norms due to country’s violent past (Webb et al., 2009). The drug industry allowed them the 
upward social mobility that their social structure had been lacking, creating a new emerging 
middle class (Hartlyn 1993; Lopez et al., 2001). This mobility and success through the drug 
industry ultimately provided the societal and community acceptance that these illicit ventures 
needed to grow.  
 
The relationship between the community and an illicit venture is extremely significant. 
Without communities viewing this business as legitimate, many drug enterprises would fail. The 
ventures can provide the community with protection, employment, and public goods, such as 
neighborhood improvement and the soccer fields that Pablo Escobar built for the poorest section 
of his neighborhood (Brice, 2003; Zimbalist et al., 2010). Even after Pablo Escobar was dead, the 
poor went to his funeral because they had admired and respected him, regardless of the number of 
people he had assassinated and terrorized for the growth of his business. Escobar was there for his 
community in a way that the government was not able or willing to be (Zimbalist et al., 2010).  
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However, as the violence and control that these cartels had over society increased, they 
soon began to lose the legitimacy and community acceptance that they had previously enjoyed. 
The industry still provided a livelihood to many, but the negative effects of displacement, guerrilla 
and paramilitary involvement, and government corruption was not accepted any longer (Lopez et 
al., 2001). In 1997, half of Colombia’s registered voters (10 million people) voted for a peace 
referendum that called for a peace talk between the guerrillas and the government (LeoGrande & 
Sharpe, 2000, p. 9).  This shift in attitude towards the industry ultimately established new norms 
and social rules that the new business paradigm sought to follow. As society began to push back in 
response to many of the negative aspects of the industry, these new ventures adapted (Lopez et al., 
2001). Many of the smaller illicit ventures today now seek this same acceptance from their 
community and society by assimilating into society and taking with them lessons learned from 
their predecessors (Lopez et al., 2001; Vellinga, 2004). Because these ventures require the 
acceptance of their community to operate and legitimize their activity, the smaller structure aids 
their business in becoming a more accepted feature in the community. Their size reduces their 
network strength so the community provides the resources these ventures need to continue to 
operate. With the community’s acceptance of their business, the ventures can effectively utilize 
the networks in society  (Vellinga, 2004).  
   
The social effects of illicit ventures  
In addition to the lack of trust in the government, the drug trade left many Colombians fearing 
those around them, which resulted in a complete lack of solidarity and trust, and a weakened sense 
of a national identity (Hartlyn, 1993; Thoumi & Windybank, 2007). Everyday exchanges between 
citizens were approached with caution and a certain level of distrust. Media feared for their lives if 
they were reporting on drug activities (Hartlyn, 1993). Listed as the fourth most deadly country for 
reporters, Mexican media has experienced a similar gripping effect. One newspaper even devoted 
an entire front page as a plea for peace with the drug cartels (Khan, 2013). With so many violent 
deaths and crimes taking place in communities, Colombians are never certain who was carrying 
out the crimes so they suspect everyone (McLean, 2002). There has been an increased level of 
pessimism that has greatly impacted the values of the Colombian people and changed the nature of 
their society (Hartlyn, 1993). Colombians once believed the industry would positively change 
their lives and bring about financial success. However, this view quickly changed to a more 
pessimistic view of the industry that actually increased inequality, human rights violations, and 
unemployment within their society.  
 
The short-term benefits of the drug trade were quickly replaced with the long-term 
negative effects. Certain groups experienced a much higher degree of success than others, 
establishing deeper class systems than before. The huge profits from the industry accumulated at 
the top, creating an emerging ‘narcobourgeoisie’ (Hartlyn, 1993; Salazar & Fierro, 1993). An 
International Monetary Fund report examining 1995 statistics stated that the upper 20 percent of 
households in Colombia earned 60 percent of the income while the lowest 20 percent earned 2 
percent of the income in Colombia (Holmes et al., 2006, p. 10). While many initially believed that 
the drug trade would bring financial prosperity, it merely drove the inequality farther apart. 
Certain growing regions saw success, but the entire region did not experience the same economic 
benefits. Only a few already involved and employed within the sector saw increased income 
(Angrist & Kugler, 2008).  The short-term relief that some regions saw was quickly replaced with 
further inequality and joblessness (Holmes et al., 2006).  
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 The increase in unemployment was seen in many areas throughout Colombia, with an 
increase to 20 percent in 2000 compared to a 7.5 percent unemployment rate in 1994 (Holmes et 
al., 2006, p. 3). Research by Holmes et al. (2006) found that an increase in coca cultivation has 
negative effects on long run employment. Trafficked items that require a significant amount of 
human capital, such as drugs, displace products that are labor intensive. As a result, Colombian 
employment in legal, labor-intensive industries are undermined. The coffee industry employs 12 
percent, while the drug trade employs close to 7 percent of workers within Colombia (Holmes et 
al., 2006, p. 7). Even those that were employed, mainly in coca growing regions, experienced a 
lower standard of living than other Colombians. In 1995, there was a steep increase in the number 
of violent deaths as well as a large increase in violence in coca cultivating regions (Angrist & 
Kugler, 2008).  
  
As discussed earlier, the violence that this industry unleashed on Colombia led to extreme 
displacement and human rights violations. The lack of social infrastructure in Colombia provided 
enough room for violent and predatory-like behavior to take place (Cardenas, 2007). With 
Colombia’s lack of social capital, there has been opportunity for violence and crime to take hold 
of their society. In 2001 alone, there was a rate of 73.3 per 1,000 people that experienced a violent 
death in Colombia, compared to the 8.2 per 1,000 in the United States. In addition, more than 
3,250 people per year have been kidnapped in Colombia since 1998 (McLean, 2002, p. 129). The 
human rights violations along with the individualistic nature of Colombians make it extremely 
difficult for society to establish a “collective identity around human rights” (Brysk, 2009, p. 41). 
The violations are sporadically discussed and have quickly become a constructed norm within 
society. There lacks a common narrative, collective cause, and legitimate leaders that can lead and 
engage the Colombian people toward a solution for the extreme abuses the drug industry has 
inflicted on society (Brysk, 2009).  
 
The role of the economy in shaping illicit ventures 
Colombia’s drug trade is worth around $10 billion, which represents 25 percent as much as the 
legal exports for the country (Badkar, 2011, slide 2). In addition, the drug trade directly employs 
300,000 people, or 3 percent of the Colombian workforce (Podur, 2003, para. 5), while in Latin 
America 2.5 to 2.7 million people are employed in the production and sales of drugs (Salazar & 
Fierro, 1993). For Colombia, drug cultivation represents 6.7 percent of agricultural production, 
whereas coffee is 12 percent (Podur, 2003, para. 5). Drug traffickers know that the state and its 
people heavily rely on this industry for economic purposes. Any change in the way that the 
industry is treated could have a devastating effect on their profits and thus Colombia’s economy 
(Podur, 2003). The number of years the drug trade has flourished in Colombia has caused it to 
become immensely integrated within the Colombian state and economy. This has centralized the 
drug trade in the state, which has directed a large portion of drug money into the economy 
(Meehan, 2011). The little progress the state has made in diversifying the economy or creating 
opportunities for rural citizens to find new employment has made some parts of society much 
more willing to take part in the drug trade. This provides these new ventures with an ample supply 
of employees and sub-contractors that they can easily access within their community (Salazar & 
Fierro, 1993).  
 
In the effort to remove all barriers for free trade through agreements like NAFTA, 
international governments inadvertently removed barriers for illicit trade as well. With free trade 
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between Mexico and the United States, many of the new small illicit ventures looked to transport 
their goods through the Mexican border rather than the Caribbean. As previously discussed, many 
of the trade routes to the United States from Colombia became more heavily guarded, but with 
NAFTA there was a much easier route to access the United States (Rodas, 2013; Singer, 2008). 
The agreement increased the amount of trade between the two countries, providing more of an 
opportunity for illicit ventures to conceal illicit products among legal products being traded. 
Border patrol is searching for a needle in continuously new haystacks. In response to this 
increased economic globalization, these new illicit ventures were willing to export much smaller 
amounts to get past the detection of border officials, often using a small shipment to distract from 
a much larger one (Dermota, 1999; Williams, 1998). They wanted to remain undetected by law 
enforcement, which shaped their shipment sizes, transportation methods, partnerships with 
Mexican cartels, and routes.  
 
The economic effects of illicit ventures 
The more profit these illicit ventures make, the more integrated and influential they became in the 
state’s economy. Many states with an active illicit economy has seen its GDP, productivity, and 
legal businesses become dependent on the illicit ventures’ investment in the state’s economy. The 
growth and composition of the GDP are greatly impacted by the economy’s integration with the 
drug trade.  In Colombia, the GDP fell significantly in the 1980s, down to 3.4 percent from 5.8 
percent in the 1970s (Cardenas, 2007, p.4). Unlike other countries in the region, Colombia saw an 
even larger GDP growth rate decline to 0.9 percent per year in the 1990s (Cardenas, 2007, p. 4). In 
1982, the drug trade made up 6.07 percent of the Colombia’s GDP (Hartlyn, 1993, p. 9). For 
countries like Guinea Bissau, a single drug transaction can account for a large portion of the 
state’s GDP (Rodas, 2013). The drug trade represents a huge segment of the GDP that goes 
unrecorded in most national income statistics, making it difficult for countries to accurately 
represent the true state of their economy. However, in 2000, Colombia began to include the 
production of illegal drug crops in their GDP calculations, as it is such a large economic activity  
(Fleming et al., 2000).  
 
The impact of drug ventures’ money in the economy can be illustrated through the 
presidential campaign of Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 in Mexico. Zedillo openly supported reforms in 
the country that would completely disrupt drug trafficking operations. The heads of illicit drug 
enterprises became worried he would follow through on his reforms and opted to withdraw their 
money out the Mexican economy. This destabilized the entire Mexican economic structure, 
affecting Mexico’s international fiscal position and its ability to pay its foreign debt. In response, 
political candidates backed off, allowing the kingpins to reinvest their money in the Mexican 
economy and stabilizing the economy (Eskridge, 2001).  Colombia greatly relies on this industry 
and these ventures for state revenue, which causes the perpetuation of the industry and draws on 
concerns about economic stability (Andreas, 1998).  
   
Legal businesses within Colombia have historically been enveloped and integrated with the 
drug industry, increasing the dependence the country’s economy has on the trade. Many business 
fronts act as legal businesses, while others are formed and run with the profits earned in the drug 
trade. As mentioned previously, the Cali trade built and operated a chain of 432 drugstores, owned 
hotels, supermarkets, airlines, bank institutions, radio stations, and soccer clubs (Vellinga, 2004). 
These ventures use the profits they make through illicit ventures to start and invest in licit ventures 
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that society and the economy depends on for growth (Carter, 1994). The economy benefits from 
huge investment in legitimate enterprises from the profits earned in the illicit drug trade and the 
ventures that invest their money into the economy.  
 
Conversely, many Colombians see drug production as a sound investment with significant 
gains, causing a lack of investment by Colombians in licit business (Holmes et al., 2006). Foreign 
investors are also hesitant in investing in Colombian business, reducing possible foreign direct 
investment that Colombia could be receiving without the drug trade presence. The United States’ 
war on drugs prompted a new foreign policy that provided “certification” for countries that the 
U.S. considered allies in the war on drugs. A certification meant that the country would continue 
receiving nonmilitary aid, U.S. representatives of multi-lateral banks would continue to vote for 
proposals from that country, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation would insure new 
investments in that country. In 1998, Colombia was decertified for the second year in a row by the 
United States. Because of this, there was a significant stagnation in foreign investment in 
Colombia, hurting the legitimate part of the economy. Colombian industries such as shrimp and 
flowers, the very industries that the United States tried to encourage through trade, were greatly 
impacted by the restrictions this decision implemented. (Dermota, 1999).  
 
In addition, the drug trade diverts capital and labor from these legitimate industries that 
could add strength and stability to the state’s economy. As the industry expanded through the 
1980s and 1990s, the need for labor greatly increased. The huge profits earned in this industry 
attracted huge numbers of people to work for these illicit ventures, causing a diversion of labor 
from legitimate industries and a productivity implosion within Colombia (Cardenas, 2007; 
LeoGrande & Sharpe, 2000).  
 
The interconnectedness of the dimensions and its impact on developing a solution 
The way in which these dimensions interact with one another provides further explanation as to 
the how illicit business paradigms greatly resemble those of legal businesses. Colombia and its 
illicit ventures are characterized by these particular external and internal factors, so it is beneficial 
to explore how these dimensions are shaped by one another and how this impacts the business 
paradigms. 
  
For many rural societies in Colombia, there was an extreme lack of legal economic 
opportunities provided both before and during the drug trade. Their view of the drug trade initially 
was that it brought forth economic opportunity and livelihood for their family. The drug ventures 
were able to take advantage of this lack of economic freedom and provide many of these 
communities with not only money for their families but also public goods such as housing and 
soccer fields. The lack of opportunity in the legal economic sector caused many to accept jobs in 
the illicit drug ventures. Industries within the legal economy were harmed by this diversion of 
labor and capital, which ultimately stunted the growth of Colombia’s economy. 
  
The little growth seen in the legal economy ultimately continued the dependence that 
society had on the illicit economy. This made it difficult for the government to gain public support 
for eradicating the drug trade. As the government struggled to find ways in which to impact the 
influence of the drug trade, many officials began to accept bribes out of fear and greed. Bribery 
and corruption began to overtake many of the decisions made by the government, causing a 
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decrease in state legitimacy among Colombians. This loss of legitimacy made it difficult for many 
governmental figures to distinguish themselves from the drug trade, making it even more difficult 
to gain public support.  
 
It is this interconnectedness among the social, political, and economic dimensions that has 
made it difficult to clearly identify a solution to ending the drug trade in Colombia. Each 
dimension shapes the other, making it complex to find a solution that does not cause unneeded 
harm to the country. However, if people began to look at these traffickers as businesses rather than 
simple, violent organizations, it would be a much more useful approach to finding a solution. 
These ventures operate within countries as any large, multinational corporation would and adapt to 
the same shifts that legal businesses do. A much more useful solution could be developed if the 
narrative surrounding these cartels changed and became one that accepted the idea that cartels are 
businesses. The chart below compares the new illicit venture paradigms to that of a legal venture:   
Paradigm New Illicit Venture Legal Venture 
Brand Reputation Yes Yes 
International channels Yes Yes 
Efficient distribution channels Yes Yes 
Supplier relations Yes Yes 
Political lobbying/participation No Yes 
Human resources Yes Yes 
Quality control Yes Yes 
Research and Development Yes Yes 
Corporate Social Responsibility Yes Yes 
Centralized Structure No Varies 
Partnerships Yes Yes 
Customer relationship management Yes Yes 
Bribery Yes, less visible though than 
old No 
 
These ventures are not perfectly compared to a legal business, as their illicit product 
determines which paradigms they can effectively implement. However, there is still a striking 
similarity between illicit ventures and legal businesses. Whether the venture is a small, 
decentralized venture like those recently established in Colombia or a large cartel like the old 
cartels in Colombia or the Sinaloa Cartel in Mexico, the illicit ventures model much of their 
strategy and organization off of legal business practices. The internal and external environment 
that characterizes both of these countries varies in comparison to one another. However, this 
variance in the social, political, and economic dimensions is what shapes the paradigms of the 
drug trafficking ventures. These illicit ventures have become increasingly similar to legal 
businesses, which, through a change in narrative, could establish a much more useful and 





Depicted as simple minded, gun bearing goons that spread violence and corruption in the countries 
they operate in, drug trafficking organizations have been surrounded by a narrative that obviously 
lacks a full understanding of these ventures. Many neglect to understand the very basic aim of 
these ventures: to fulfill the demand of over 230 million drug users worldwide. To fulfill this 
demand, these ventures utilize many of the same paradigms are used by legal businesses. Many 
make revenues that are comparable to legal multinational companies, which are often the same 
companies that these illicit ventures model their organizational structure and leadership paradigms 
after. These paradigms shift according to the external and internal environment of the countries 
that these illicit ventures operate in. I explored the social, economic, and political factors that 
shaped the shift to the new business paradigms seen in these new illicit ventures. 
 
Through my analysis, I found that there are several internal and external factors that have 
shaped the paradigms. Internally, the dependence of the Colombian government on the drug trade, 
the nature of the Colombian culture, the social acceptance of the industry, and the lack of ample 
opportunities in the legal economy form the paradigms of illicit drug ventures. External forces of 
economic globalization and increased foreign political pressure also play a part in shaping illicit 
business paradigms. As the illicit ventures continue to grow and develop in Colombia, they 
become increasingly more integrated in society, the political landscape, and the economy. As these 
changes take place internally and externally, the illicit business paradigms are shaped accordingly.   
 
Through the examination of both the Colombian and Mexican experiences, I conclude that 
these internal and external factors have shaped a new illicit business paradigm that greatly shares 
many similarities of legal business paradigms. In countries that are characterized by these 
particular external and internal factors, illicit ventures are in fact very similar to legal businesses. 
By altering the narrative that currently surrounds these ventures, it would be much more effective 
in determining the best approach to slow the growth of the drug trade. These ventures are complex 
and integrated businesses that must be treated as such.  
 
It could be beneficial to further research the effect that drug legalization laws have on the 
drug industry. Legalization would effectively place these once illicit businesses into the legal 
economy, providing these businesses with formal institutions and boundaries. They would be 
treated just as any other large multinational business would be treated. Additionally, taking the 
illicit nature out of their product may make it less of a desirable and profitable trade. Another area 
of further research could be determining the effectiveness that the expansion of drug treatment 
facilities and options within the United States would have on slowing the growth of the drug trade. 
By stemming the demand for drugs, there would be much less opportunity for the expansion of 
these illicit ventures. Many legal businesses fail due to a lack of demand for their product, which 
could thus be the same for the illicit drug industry. As Pablo Escobar simply stated, “If there are 
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